[From the New York Herald,
1873; story by Edward Fox]
Herald
Headquarters.
Lost River Camp, Oregon,
Feb. 8, 1873. [Abridged.]
he battle of the lava beds has attracted so much general
attention, both from the fact of the United States troops receiving such a
severe check and from the varied descriptions of the scene of the contest, that
I have prepared a pretty full report of that memorable engagement, feeling
convinced that the details will be read with interest by the public in general.
After Captain Jack was driven from his camp on Lost River and
took refuge in the lava beds, it was thought at first that he would come to
terms and the war would be ended without further bloodshed. The addition, however, of fourteen warriors
to his forces, that were really driven to the lava beds by the threats of the
Linkville citizens, heated by Linkville whiskey, resulted in Captain Jack
wishing to make his own terms.
But Major General Frank Wheaton, who, as the commanding
officer of the [District of the] lakes, had come down in person to attend to
this affair, soon arrived at the conclusion that if fighting was to be done the
sooner this lava bed was inspected the better.
Arrangements were then made for an attack, and as soon as the available
troops had arrived in the neighborhood General Wheaton had several councils
with Colonel Green, Colonel Mason and others as to the best means of getting at
Jack in his lair. The lava beds were
inspected and all the old settlers interrogated as to the geography, with
reference to the moving of troops in that direction. There appeared to be a good many opinions as
to the nature of the ground within the lava beds section, and, although all
agreed in saying it was a very rough country, no one was competent to describe
the extraordinary volcanic formations that were afterwards discovered by the
troops when they made the assault. After
mature consideration of the various plans of attack that were suggested General
Wheaton decided to make a movement in force, which, should it prove successful,
would at least enable him to obtain a satisfactory reconnaissance of the ground
upon which to base his plans for any future aggressive movement. Everything being arranged, the following
orders were issued to the officers in command:—
Headquarters District of the Lakes
and of the Troops Operating
in the Modoc Country
Camp near Van Brimmer’s Ranch,
Cal.,
Jan. 12, 1873.
General Field Orders—No. 3.
1. The troops will move
from their present camp east and west of the lava beds on Thursday, 16th of
January, and take positions for the attack on the Modoc camp at sunrise on the
following morning.
2. At four A.M. on
Thursday next Major John Green will detach Captain D. Perry’s Troop, F, First
cavalry, and order it to clear the bluff southwest of Tule of Indian pickets and
scouts, and cover the movement of the main force to a camp some three miles
west of the Modoc position.
3. Major E. C. Mason’s
battalion Twenty-first infantry, two companies—C, Captain G. H. Burton, and B,
commanded by Second Lieutenant H. D. W. Moore—and a detachment of twenty men of
F company, Twenty-first infantry, under First Sergeant John McNamara; General
J. E. Ross, Oregon volunteer militia, two companies—A, Captain Hugh Kelly, and
B, Captain O. E. Applegate—and Lieutenant W. H. Miller’s battery—a section of
mountain howitzers—will march from Van Brimmer’s Ranch to camp on bluff west of
Tule Lake, in time to reach the designated camp not later than three P.M. on
the 16th inst. The camp will be so
located and arranged as to be secure from observation by the Modocs, and every
precaution taken to prevent the Indians from discovering our numbers and
precise location.
4. District
Headquarters will accompany the troops.
5. Early on the 17th of
January the troops above named will move into the lava beds to attack the Modoc
camp, and in the following order:—Major E. C. Mason’s battalion, Twenty-first
infantry, leading, followed by General J. E. Ross’ Oregon volunteer militia and
the section of mountain howitzers packed.
Captain D. Perry, Troop F, First cavalry, will follow the howitzer
battery.
6. When the troops have
reached a position near the Modoc camp the main force will be deployed on the
right of the infantry battalion, in close skirmish order, and a left half-wheel
of the whole line will be executed in order to enclose the southern side of the
Modoc position and connect the right of the main force with the left of Captain
Bernard’s troop, who are simultaneously to attack on the east.
7. Also the troops
operating against the Modocs are to move from this camp, with three days’
cooked rations in haversacks, two blankets, one hundred rounds of ammunition on
the person, and fifty rounds in close reserve.
Canteens will be filled at Little Klamath Lake by the troops moving from
Van Brimmer’s Ranch, and care taken to water every horse and pack mule at that
point, as there is no water on the bluff where the main force will encamp on
the night of the 16th inst.
8. Major John Green,
First cavalry, is charged with the execution of these movements and the details
of the attack.
9. Lieutenant W. H.
Miller, First cavalry, commanding the howitzer battery, will report to Major
Green for orders and instructions as to when and where to prepare his guns for
action in the proposed attack.
10. The troops on the
east side of the lava beds at Land’s ranch, Troops “G,” Captain R. F. Bernard,
and “B,” Captain James Jackson, First cavalry, and the Klamath Indian scouts
under Dave Hill, will move from camp on the 16th inst. to a point not more than
two miles from the Modoc position. At
sunrise on the 17th this force will attack the Modoc camp, with their right
resting on or near Tule Lake, and when sufficiently near to render the movement
advisable a right half wheel will be executed, in order to connect the left of
this force with the troops attacking from the west. In his advance Captain Bernard will take
steps to capture any canoes the Modocs may have near their camp, or at least
use every effort to prevent Indians escaping by water. Captain R. F. Bernard, First cavalry, will
execute these movements under such detailed instructions as he may receive from
Major John Green, First cavalry.
11. After the first
three shots have been fired by the howitzer battery as the signal for the
troops attacking on the east side of the Modoc camp firing will cease for
fifteen minutes, and an Indian scout directed to notify the nearest Modocs that
ten minutes’ time will be allowed them to permit their women and children to
come into our lines. Any propositions by
the Modocs to surrender will be referred at once to the District Commander, who
will be present.
12. Lieutenant W. H.
Boyle, Twenty-first infantry, Acting Field Quartermaster and Commissary of
Subsistence, and a guard of ten men, will remain at this camp in charge of the
temporary field depot until further orders.
13. Lieutenant John
Adams, First cavalry, Acting Assistant Adjutant General, District of the Lakes,
and commanding detachment, H troop, First cavalry, will furnish from his
command such details as may be required for the howitzer battery, and accompany
the District Commander. Lieutenant Adams
will be prepared to communicate by signals with the Signal Sergeant, who has
been detailed for duty with the troops operating on the east side of the Modoc
position.
14. Assistant Surgeon
Henry McElderry, United States Army, will give the necessary directions and
instructions to the medical officers with the different commands and
detachments in the field.
By order of
Brevet Major General Frank Wheaton, U.S.A.,
Lieutenant Colonel Twenty-first infantry,
Commanding District of the Lakes.
John Q. Adams, First Lieutenant First cavalry,
Acting Assistant Adjutant General.
In pursuance of the above and according to instructions, the
troops moved from their quarters on the 16th inst. and camped in the respective
locations to which they were assigned.
Colonel Bernard, with two troops of the First cavalry, had a little
skirmish on the evening of the 16th, as in the fog, which is very prevalent in
that section of the country, he advanced rather nearer to Jack’s stronghold
than he intended, and when he found out his mistake and made a move to retire,
the Indians opened fire from a position they had taken in the rocks. They were finally driven from their shelter
and forced to retreat to their stronghold, but not before they had wounded
three of the cavalry.
On the following morning the troops had all arrived at their
assigned positions, and at daybreak Lieutenant Adams, Acting Assistant Adjutant
General, reported to General Wheaton, the District Commander, the following
force in the field:—
|
Corps.
|
Commanding Officer Muster
|
|
First cavalry
|
Captain Perry, F troop
|
46
|
|
First cavalry
|
Captain Jackson, B
troop
|
42
|
|
First cavalry
|
Captain Bernard, G
troop
|
47
|
|
First cavalry
|
Lieut. Adams, H troop
|
16
|
|
Twenty-first infantry
|
Lieut. Ross, B company
|
33
|
|
Twenty-first infantry
|
Capt. Burton, C company
|
57
|
|
Oregon field officers
|
|
7
|
|
Oregon volunteers
|
Captain O. Applegate, A
company
|
56
|
|
Oregon volunteers
|
Captain Kelly, B
company
|
46
|
|
California volunteers
|
Captain Fairchild
|
25
|
|
Indian scouts
|
Dave Hill
|
20
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total
|
|
400
|
|
|
|
There was also a
section of mountain howitzers under the charge of Lieutenant Miller, of the
First cavalry.
|
|
Table
2.1
|
The troops on the west side moved down the precipitous bluff
from their camping ground in the direction of the lava beds, Colonel Mason’s
battalion of the Twenty-first infantry leading, followed by Captain Fairchild’s
California riflemen, General Ross’ two companies of Oregon volunteers, the
howitzer section, packed on mules, under the command of Lieutenant W. H.
Miller, of the First cavalry, and Brevet Colonel D. Perry’s troop of the First
cavalry bringing up the rear. The
morning was damp and cold, and the lava beds were nearly obscured from sight by
a dense fog, which, however, only hung over that section and did not rise to
the bluff which the troops had just left.
The troops on the east side, commanded by Brevet Colonel R. B. Bernard,
of the First cavalry, comprising his Troop G, and Brevet Major James Jackson’s
Troop B, First cavalry, with twenty Klamath Indian scouts, commanded by Dave
Hill, simultaneously advanced from the position they had taken the previous
evening, two miles from Captain Jack’s stronghold. On account of the deep chasm and gorge in his
front Colonel Bernard was unable to advance further than the position he had
reached by severe skirmishing on the evening of the 16th.
The advance, attack and management of the troops were
conducted by Major John Green, First cavalry, Brevet Colonel United States
Army, and the district commander, Brevet Major General Frank Wheaton,
Lieutenant Colonel of Twenty-first infantry, accompanied the troops, operating
on the west side. This force had moved
forward from the base of the bluffs, with Captain Burton’s company of the
Twenty-first infantry ahead in skirmishing order. Upon the arrival of the troops at the lake a
rush was made for water, as the men were naturally thirsty, having passed the
night at a dry camp. The advance was
then resumed across this rugged country, and it was with the greatest
difficulty the men were kept in line, as the unnatural irregularities of the
volcanic rock formed nearly insurmountable obstacles to their progress. The line was now being deployed to the right,
with Colonel Perry on the extreme right, stretching into the heart of this
fastness about a mile and a half, while Captain Burton moved with his company
on the extreme left, supported by Lieutenant Moore and his command on his
right. The Oregon and California
volunteers spread out the line between the extreme points and kept a steady
advance, although the nature of the ground kept an irregularity in the face of
the line.
The plan of the attack was to keep deploying in a half wheel
to the right until Colonel Perry should connect with Colonel Bernard, who was
adopting similar tactics, but moving from the left. The fog still hung low and shrouded the
mysteries of this craggy fastness from these daring explorers, though the
frequent crack of a rifle, followed by an unearthly war whoop, denoted some
fresh victim to the unerring marksmanship of these dusky warriors. It was impossible for men to do more than
both the soldiers and the volunteers did on this occasion, and although every
now and then there would be a vacancy in the muster roll, and some gallant soul
would fall by the bullet of an unseen foe, another brave heart would fill up
the gap and press on with the steadiness of a disciplined soldier. In vain the troops looked high and low for
some Indian sign, and although the fog would rise every now and then, not an
Indian showed as much as the top of his head feathers.
About noon Captain Perry, on the extreme right, arrived at an
impassable chasm, at least it was impassable without a fearful sacrifice of
life. Captain Perry sent back to the
district commander that it would be impossible for him to connect with Colonel
Bernard by the right except by an immense loss of life, and added that if
necessary he would carry the chasm, but he did not expect to take ten men
across. General Wheaton then came to the
conclusion that if the proposed connection could not be made they might as well
retire and wait for a few days, and consequently issued orders to that effect,
but gave Major Green a discretionary power to push forward and connect by the
left if he deemed it feasible. Major
Green then ordered a flank movement by the left, and, skirting along the lake
under the shadow of some craggy strata of volcanic rock, in the possession of
the enemy, they finally made the desired connection, but not before the galling
fire to which they had been subjected had thinned their ranks considerably.
It would fill columns to detail the incidents of this fight,
which proved such a trial to the officers, soldiers and volunteers that formed
the attacking party. General Wheaton
told me the other day that he had been through all the principal battles during
the rebellion and he had never seen officers and men appear so utterly indifferent
to danger or so cool and steady under such a harrassing fire. The Indians did not waste much powder and
shot, as they were excellent marksmen, and, having the advantage of a rest for
the rifle and perfect safety from a return fire, were unerring in their aim.
Often a man would fall badly wounded, and, looking eagerly
around for his enemy, would only see the smoke of a rifle curling up from a
small hole on some inaccessible crag overhanging his position. On one occasion a man was shot dead at a
certain spot, and another man was sent with a stretcher to carry away his
body. The second met the fate of the
first, and a third, who went on the same errand, fell badly wounded. These three men all fell without knowing the
position of the Indians who had shot them.
Every little narrow passage between the rocks that was likely
to be of importance was guarded by two or three rifles peeping out from
loopholes that the Indians had formed for that purpose. On the move along the lake to the left the
men had to move with the greatest caution, as the Indians had lined the
overhanging bluffs with their men, and to show yourself in full view was nearly
certain death. They crawled on their
hands and feet, making a dart every now and then from one rock to another, but
still pushing forward in the direction of Colonel Bernard. Captain Perry, who was with his troops on the
left, while stretched behind a rock accidentally turned on his side and exposed
a portion of his shoulder and arm, receiving a severe flesh wound, which
compelled him to retire. Colonel Green
and Colonel Mason were perpetually in the hottest of the fire, and appear to
have charmed lives, as although their uniforms were, in many instances, cut by
a passing ball, neither received a scratch during the fight. There was not an officer that went into the
lava beds that did not come out with some portion of his clothing marked or
torn by a bullet. When the troops on the
west side finally connected with Colonel Bernard they found him stopped from
further advance by an immense chasm that appeared impassable, and which was
strongly defended by Indians.
Shortly before dark the fog lifted slightly and showed the
Oregon volunteers, a portion of Captain Perry’s troop and the infantry reserve
still on the west side, and, at a signal from the District Commander, Major
Green fell back to Land’s Ranch to camp for the night with Bernard’s command
and the infantry battalion. The Oregon
and California volunteers retired by the west side and fell back in Van Bremer’s
Ranch. I cannot conclude without saying
something of the difficulties experienced in the retreat to Land’s ranch, and
of the bravery and heroism exhibited by the officers and men on that
occasion. They had been up since four
A.M. and fighting since half-past six A.M. up to dark. The retreat commenced at half-past ten P.M.
and continued all night and up to one A.M. next day. Thirty-three hours without rest or food are
enough to try the patience and endurance of most men, but these gallant fellows
never uttered a word, and were always ready to relieve one another at the end
of a blanket, carrying the sick and wounded.
Surgeon McElderry worked unceasingly, and through the day was exposed on
several occasions to a dangerous fire, but never flinched from his duty, and
rushed from place to place to the assistance of the wounded.
